Previous comparative analyses of gross and net settlement have focused on the credit risk of the central counterparty in net settlement arrangements and on the incentives for participants to alter the risk of their portfolios under net settlement. By modeling the trading economy that generates the demand for payment services, we are able to show some largely unexplored advantages of net settlement. We find that net settlement can prevent certain gridlock situations, which may arise in gross settlement in the absence of delivery versus payment requirements. In addition, we show that net settlement can economize on collateral requirements and avoid trading delays.
tended to emphasize the disadvantages of netting relative to gross settlement arrangements.
However, most previous analyses have implicitly assumed a "delivery-versuspayment" (DVP) gross settlement system-that is, a system in which the underlying trade occurs at the same time as the settlement. In particular, analyses have typically ignored the underlying trades, which in effect assumes that they are made when payment is made. In this paper we compare the incentives for strategic default in net settlement systems with those in gross settlement systems with and without DVP. We find that net settlement has some previously unexplored advantages. Net settlement can avoid delays in trading that occur in gross settlement systems. In particular, net settlement systems avoid certain "gridlock" outcomes, where trading would break down entirely in gross settlement systems that do not use DVP. In some situations, gross settlement can avoid gridlock, but only by using potentially costly collateral. In cases where trading requires collateral, net settlement can economize on its use. These considerations are important in designing effective payment systems.
The modeling approach we use is one of incomplete contract enforcement. The usefulness of this approach lies partly in its realism. When payments are not settled at the instant of incurring an obligation, counterparty risk arises in the interaction between the debtor and the creditor (and other parties in the system) in the interim before settlement. In a world of complete contracts these interactions would be governed by a customized contract that fully addresses the set of interacting contingencies of the underlying trades. In the rapid working of day-to-day commerce, however, customizing contracts for each trade would be prohibitively costly. Instead, the obligations created by rapid-fire trading are governed by standard legal contracts, which create an intricate ordering and reordering of seniority and priority of debts during the course of trade. Thus the incentives of the agents in the model will depend not only on the rules of the payment systems but also on the general legal rules for default and bankruptcy. In describing the effects of various modifications of the payment system we will hold these aspects of the legal structure constant. An advantage of our analysis is that it makes this dependence on the legal system explicit and allows us to consider, in a rudimentary way at least, the effects of changes in the bankruptcy laws on the relative efficiency of various payment arrangements.
The fundamental problem of a payment system is whether promised payments will actually occur, and the most basic concern should therefore be the extent to which the rules of the payment system encourage or discourage the fulfillment of payment obligations. In our model we utilize the idea of strategic default (developed in Kahn and Roberds 1998) as the basic incentive problem. Strategic default has the virtue of simplicity, facilitating analysis, but it also is a natural proxy for other forms of incentive problems. The consequence of changes in the likelihood of default will be a change in the willingness of parties to engage in trade. Thus the payment system arrangements in our model's financial sector will have welfare consequences through their effects on the model's real sector.
THE MODEL ENVIRONMENT
The economy is populated with agents known as "banks." Initially there will be three time periods, t ϭ 0,1,2, which span a single trading day. A bank's objective is to maximize its consumption in period t ϭ 2. There are three types of goods: customizable intermediate goods of many varieties, a final good, and a third storable good, "manna," which will be used to facilitate payments. (Manna can be thought of as incoming funds transfers to the bank, whose timing is exogenous.) Each type of good has distinguishing physical and legal characteristics.
Only the final good can be consumed. No bank's endowment includes the final good. However, all banks are endowed in period t ϭ 0 with one indivisible unit of an intermediate good, which can be used to produce the final good in period t ϭ 2. For banks to have an incentive to trade, production of the final good from intermediate goods will involve a "credit chain," as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) . That is, banks are divided into I types, where I Ͼ 2 and there are an equal number of banks of each type. For convenience, we sometimes refer to a representative bank of type i, where i ϭ 1, ..., I, as "bank i" or simply "i." To produce a final good, bank i requires the input at the beginning of period 2 of the customized intermediate good initially held by bank i Ϫ 1 (mod I). Banks can costlessly deliver their customized intermediate good in period t ϭ 1. In production, one unit of the appropriate customized intermediate good yields F Ͼ 1 units of the final good, and the intermediate good is destroyed in the process. If the intermediate good is not put to its customized use, then it has a salvage value C Ͻ 1 in terms of the final good.
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There is a third type of good, manna. All banks are endowed with M units of manna, which arrives at the beginning of period t ϭ 2. Like the intermediate goods, manna can be used to produce the final good. However, manna differs from the intermediate goods in two respects. First, one unit of manna yields exactly one unit of the final good, and second, manna is not customized, so that its value is the same to all banks.
Since the focus of our analysis is interbank payment systems, we will interpret agents' trading in intermediate goods as a proxy for any trading of financial claims that gives rise to interbank obligations. 3 The level of abstraction is such that the model does not distinguish between trades for customers and trades for the banks' own account. Settlement of obligations by transferring the final good will correspond to settlement in central bank funds, and the appearance of manna endowments will correspond to anticipated, exogenous incoming funds transfers.
In addition to their physical distinctions, different goods will have different legal characteristics according to whether they are "attachable" in bankruptcy. Suppose that a bank defaults on a commitment and is forced into bankruptcy (in a modern setting, it would be closed down by a regulator). If the bank's attachable assets are A and its obligations to creditors are O, then payoffs to the bankrupt and the creditor are, respectively,
and min{O, βA} ,
where α (the debtor's share in bankruptcy) 4 and β (the creditor's share) are positive fractions such that α ϩ β Ͻ 1. That is, in case of default, attachable goods are subject to partial seizure by creditors and are also subject to decay. With respect to the three types of goods, we assume that final goods and intermediate goods are always attachable. We will compare situations where manna is or is not attachable.
The motivation for the bankruptcy rules, Equations (1) and (2), is that in the case of defaults, claims of "outside" creditors such as a bank's trading counterparties may have less than absolute priority, particularly when the bank is highly leveraged. In such cases, a default will diminish the value of the bank's assets. Also, if a bank thinks that it will default, it may find ways, depending on the legal regime, of redirecting an incoming transfer (i.e., its manna endowment) so that it is not attachable in bankruptcy.
The bankruptcy rules, Equations (1) and (2), are necessarily somewhat biased toward default since they do not take into account the "going concern" value of the bank that would be present in a dynamic environment. Since it is unlikely that a bank's going concern value could be expropriated by its managers or other insiders in the event of bankruptcy, its presence would provide a disincentive for strategic default. Nonetheless the default incentive would remain for some parameter values at least, and the qualitative nature of the analysis below would be largely unaffected.
DECENTRALIZED TRADING UNDER GROSS SETTLEMENT
In this environment, there is one "round" of decentralized trading. In period t ϭ 0, banks seek out trading partners in order to obtain the intermediate goods necessary for production. Bank i enters into a contract to supply bank i ϩ 1 with an intermediate good in period t ϭ 1 in return for some payment in the final good at the end of period t ϭ 2. In addition, bank i obtains a commitment from bank i Ϫ 1 to provide bank i with an intermediate good, also in return for a later payment of the final good. In both cases the size of the future payment is determined by a bilateral bargaining process, in which both parties possess some bargaining power. Thus, the payment divides the surplus between intermediate good producer and final good producer, with each receiving a strictly positive share, implying C Ͻ P Ͻ F, where P is the going unit price of an intermediate good in terms of final goods, i.e., P is the promised payment from one bank to another.
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In period t ϭ 1, banks customize their intermediate goods and deliver these goods to the bank that will use them to produce the final good. At t ϭ 2, after banks receive their manna endowments, the final good is produced and, barring default, creditors are paid. In each period, all participants have full information about the actions of all other participants in previous periods.
Payments take place according to the rules of "the payment system." The first type of payment system we consider will operate under real-time gross settlement (RTGS), in this section simply "gross settlement," as there is only one round of trading. We focus on gross settlement because this type of settlement (in various forms) is currently used in most large-value payment systems, including Fedwire in the U.S., Target in the Euro area, and BOJ-Net in Japan. In the model environment we interpret the term "gross settlement" to mean that for settlement to occur, banks must actually deliver the promised payment, in the final good, to their creditors. This interpretation corresponds to the commonly accepted definition of a gross settlement system (Bank for International Settlements 1997, p.3), whereby obligations may only be extinguished by transfer of central bank funds. Note that gross settlement is not the same as delivery-versus-payment, i.e., "spot" trades of intermediate goods for the equivalent of final goods. In this initial setup, such trades are precluded by the specified timing of events, meaning that credit must be extended for exchange to occur. 6 A bank's strategy σ over the trading day will be given by σ ϭ (τ, d, s), where τ represents the bank's trading decision at t ϭ 0, d represents its delivery decision at t ϭ 1, and s represents its settlement decision at t ϭ 2. The trading decision has two components, i.e., τ ϭ (τ D , τ S ), where τ D represents the bank's decision whether to request delivery of an intermediate good at the going price, P, and τ S represents the bank's decision whether to offer to supply an intermediate good at the going price. 7 If bank i commits to supply at t ϭ 0, (that is, if it makes an offer to supply bank i ϩ 1 while i ϩ 1 simultaneously makes a request from bank i), then d represents the bank's decision to either deliver or not, i.e., whether to honor its contractual obligation at t ϭ 1. If the bank contracts for delivery at t ϭ 0 and delivery occurs at t ϭ 1, then s represents the banks decision whether to settle or default at t ϭ 2.
Below we will consider symmetric, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Given the information structure, such equilibria can be easily calculated by working backward period by period through the game. In the analysis that follows we will simultaneously handle the cases where manna is or is not attachable; let the variable a equal 1 if manna is attachable and 0 if it is not. Let d iϪ1 represent the intermediate good delivery of bank i Ϫ 1. Then i's attachable assets are given by
Now consider the incentives of banks to default in period t ϭ 2. Say bank i ϩ 1 supplied an intermediate good to bank i. If i believes that i ϩ 1 will default, then i will strictly prefer to default in turn iff it enjoys higher consumption as a result of the default, i.e., iff
Above, P iϪ1 represents the promised payment of i to i Ϫ 1. In words, the LHS of Inequality (4) equals
whereas the RHS of Inequality (4) equals (value of i's assets) -(payment to i -1) ϩ (creditor's claim on i ϩ 1) .
Note that in Inequality (4) we must take some stand on what happens in the case of double defaults, i.e., what happens to the creditor's share of a defaulting bank's attachable assets when the creditor is also in default. For tractability, we have adopted the convention that the creditor's share vanishes in the case of double defaults; other reasonable assumptions will be messier but should cause no significant change in our results. Suppose that all banks have traded, have delivered intermediate goods, and have produced their final goods. Will banks now settle or default? In symmetric equilibrium, Inequality (4) reduces to
Condition (7) guarantees "mutually assured default," i.e., banks will default as long as they believe that other banks, and specifically their debtor, will default. On the other hand, suppose that bank i ϩ 1 does not default, in which case i's attachable assets are
Hence, if i ϩ 1 settles, then i will strictly prefer to settle with i Ϫ 1 if and only if
provided we are in the case where default would lower i's payment to i Ϫ 1, i.e., where
In symmetric equilibrium, Condition (9) and (10) reduce to
and
If Conditions (11) and (12) jointly hold, then "mutually assured settlement" will occur, i.e., all banks will settle as long as they believe that other banks will settle. In the case where Condition (12) is reversed, it can be easily shown that each bank will always have an incentive to settle if it believes that other banks will settle. Thus Condition (11) alone is sufficient for mutually assured settlement in this case. In the calculations above, it is possible that either all banks will settle or all banks will default at t ϭ 2, or both, depending on the size of bankruptcy shares and also on negotiated prices. We will first consider situations where mutually assured default and mutually assured settlement are both possible.
Lemma 1: Sufficient conditions for mutually assured default and mutually assured settlement to hold simultaneously are (i) that banks' manna endowment M is zero,
(ii) that the bankruptcy shares α and β satisfy β Ͻ α Ͻ1/2 , and (iii) that the surplus from production of the final good is not too large, i.e., FրC is sufficiently close to unity.
Proof: the proof is immediate and is omitted.
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In Lemma 1, conditions (i) and (iii) basically impose limits on banks' wealth, so that under some conditions at least, banks have an interest in default. Condition (ii) requires that there be deviations from absolute priority (β Ͻ α) but that debtors not be able to walk away with too large a share of their assets after a default (α Ͻ 1/2). Proposition 1 shows that an extreme form of "payments gridlock" can occur under gross settlement. Gridlock is manifested by a complete breakdown of trade as banks attempt to shield themselves from a possible ring of defaults. This problem is a coordination failure since it is only one of two possible equilibria; normal trade can occur under optimistic expectations.
As noted by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) in similar environments, the possibility of payments gridlock creates a form of pure liquidity risk. Gridlock is not caused by any fundamental uncertainty about the value of banks' investments, but instead results from banks' distrust of their mutual creditworthiness. The threat of default by any one bank can cause a loss in priority of all interbank claims, thereby creating a situation where banks find default to be their best option. If banks anticipate this costly outcome, they will extend no intraday credit and no trade will occur. Also, since the loss of liquidity in gridlock equilibrium arises from a simple form of moral hazard (strategic default), the occurrence of gridlock is essentially invariant to the pattern of trading within the economy. From Condition (7), a bank's incentive to default varies directly with its gross indebtedness, not with the pattern of indebtedness (ceteris paribus, the temptation to default on a group of creditors is just as strong as the temptation to default on a single creditor). This contrasts with some models in the literature (e.g., Rochet, 2000, Allen and Gale, 2000) in which settlement obligations are created by banks' provision of liquidity across separate geographic locations. In these models, breakdowns in trade are possible under some trading patterns but not others, depending on the alignments of deposit flows or the completeness of interbank markets.
In the setup above, gridlock does not arise, however, if a central bank (or other credible outside party) is willing to guarantee normal settlement. Since banks are fundamentally solvent, a guarantor need never bail out any bank and hence the guarantor incurs no costs as it simply provides banks reassurance against settlement failures. Clearly, such blanket guarantees of the payment system may not always be available or desirable. Hence we now examine some alternative means of eliminating gridlock equilibria.
Consider a version of this environment where banks have positive manna endowments. For a sufficiently large and attachable manna endowment M, Condition (12) will fail, so that delivering banks will not default as long as their manna endowment is attachable. Indeed, the banks collectively would be willing to establish a legal arrangement ex ante in which manna is attachable. If such an arrangement is not established, then by an argument identical to that in Proposition 1, coordination failure remains a possible outcome. These considerations prove the following proposition. In a gross settlement system, preventing a coordination failure in settlement requires some means by which banks can increase the priority of creditors' claims. One way of doing this is by making a large enough portion of their endowment goods attachable so that incentives for strategic default are extinguished. In the context of the model, Proposition 2 says that banks can do this but only if they can somehow commit to making their incoming transfers attachable. If banks must credibly commit to attachability as a condition of payment system participation, banks will anticipate that all payment system participants will deliver intermediate goods and settle in final goods. Hence in this case each bank has an incentive to commit to attachability if it can credibly do so.
In the case of some traditional payment systems where all participants are based in one country with a single, central-bank-sponsored wholesale payment system and where all participants would be subject to the same judicial system in bankruptcy, it may be relatively easy to implement this type of arrangement. In such cases, incoming payments will typically arrive on the books of the central bank, giving the payment system de facto first claim on all such inflows. The priority of the central bank's claim in such cases depends on the central bank's right to set off a bank's inflows against its accumulated debts. This right is well established in most legal systems. In cases where payment system participants are based in different jurisdictions, implementation of such a scheme may be more problematic (Bank for International Settlements 1992).
An alternative method of increasing creditors' priority would be to require banks to pledge collateral prior to trading. 9 To model collateral, we must vary the setup slightly so that some of each bank's intermediate good endowment can be diverted prior to trading. Trading patterns remain the same as before: a bank can only accommodate one other bank's customization order, i.e., each bank continues to supply at most one other bank with intermediate goods. Suppose that a collateral facility is available and that a fraction γ of each bank's intermediate good endowment must be deposited with the payment system as collateral before the supplying bank will deliver its intermediate good. Collateral is only useful if the priority of creditors' claims to collateral is somehow greater than for other assets, so we suppose that absolute priority holds for assets posted as collateral.
10 In other words, collateral functions in the customary way: if the bank does not default on its settlement obligation, its collateral is returned at the end of the day, but if the bank defaults, the defaulting bank's collateral is set off against its unpaid debt. A collateral facility is therefore an effective way of allowing banks to guarantee creditors' priority. Posting collateral is costly, however, because the payment system does not have access to production technologies, so any returned collateral is only worth its salvage value, C. Formally, we can show the following.
Corollary to Proposition 2: Suppose manna is not attachable. If there exists a collateral facility and the collateral requirement satisfies
γ 1 Ϫ γ ≥ (α Ϫ β) ( F 2C ) ,(13)
then the autarky equilibrium is eliminated. An all-deliver, all-settle equilibrium remains, but this equilibrium is dominated by the equilibrium in Proposition 2(b).
Note that the "settlement incentive condition," Condition (13), is always satisfied for some γ ʦ (0,1).
11 In other words, the possibility of gridlock can be eliminated at some cost.
TRADING UNDER NET SETTLEMENT
We next focus on net settlement. Until fairly recently net settlement was the norm in most large-value payment systems, and it continues to be employed in some systems (e.g., the Canadian LVTS system). In the model environment, net settlement means the following. At the end of period t ϭ 2, the payment system calculates each bank's net obligation vis-à-vis all other banks. Each bank's original payment obligation is then replaced with its net obligation vis-à-vis the payment system, i.e., the payment system becomes a substitute counterparty.
12 Banks in a net debit or due-to position then transfer final goods to the payment system, which in turn transfers these to the banks in a net credit or due-from position. The formal definition of equilibrium remains as above.
A key distinction between net and gross settlement systems is that under net settlement, a default of a net debtor necessarily affects the entire payment system, making normal settlement impossible. A complete specification of a net settlement system thus requires some rules for completing (or suspending) settlement and for allocating losses when a default occurs. We consider two rules commonly employed in real-world net settlement arrangements: Loss-Sharing Rule 1 ("unwinding rule"). If a bank defaults, its transactions are removed from that day's transactions, net positions are recalculated for the remaining banks, and settlement of the recalculated positions proceeds as in normal settlement.
Loss-Sharing Rule 2 ("Lamfalussy rule"). Banks must post collateral as a condition for participation and share the losses resulting from a default. Specifically, the Lamfalussy rule calls for banks to post at least enough collateral to cover a default by any single member.
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The Lamfalussy rule is the rule recommended in the Lamfalussy Report (Bank for International Settlements 1990) and subsequently implemented over many largevalue payment systems. Before 1990, the unwinding rule was the usual rule for such systems.
Under net settlement, the following result is immediate:
Proposition 3: Under conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 1, under net settlement only an all-deliver, all-settle equilibrium is possible. Any equilibrium under a Lamfalussy loss-sharing rule is dominated by an equilibrium under an unwinding rule.
Proposition 3 spotlights a key advantage of net settlement over RTGS, which is that net settlement can eliminate gridlock without the need for either a system by which banks can make future inflows (manna endowments) attachable or for a collateral facility. Net settlement is effective in this dimension because it de facto gives absolute priority to offsetting claims, which are automatically discharged. 14 Offsetting is only possible, in turn, when banks' original obligations are replaced by the debits and credits of a centralized clearinghouse.
Another noteworthy aspect of net settlement is that a bank's membership in a net settlement system generates a kind of network effect. Consider, for example, a four-bank, four-type version of the model, where the payment system settles on a net basis. The fact that all four banks belong to the system generates benefits for all banks, in the sense that gridlock equilibria are excluded. Hence, "a network effect" (see Weinberg 1997 ) is generated in the usual sense, that the social benefit of a bank's membership exceeds the bank's private benefit. This occurs even though each one of the banks is never a direct counterparty to one of the other banks.
CHANGES IN BANKRUPTCY PAYOFFS
In this section we will investigate the effects of bankruptcy rules on the payment systems we have established. The results shown above were derived for fairly sharp restrictions on model parameters and particularly on the bankruptcy shares α and β. Lemma 1 requires that these parameters be set in such a way that there are deviations from absolute priority, but Lemma 1 also requires that debtors bear a significant share of the costs of default. We now consider the effects of variations in these parameters.
It is clear that problems with coordination failures will diminish as creditors' priority increases, i.e., as the debtor's share, α, is driven to 0 and the creditor's share, β, approaches unity. In other words, within this simple structure, bankruptcy rules enforcing strict priority encourage settlement.
What about the opposite situation, where enforcement of priority rules is further relaxed? Consider the situation where the value of the creditor's share, β, is quite small (possibly 0) and the value of the debtor's share, α, approaches unity. As α increases, eventually Conditions (7) and (12) will hold, but Condition (11) will fail. In words this means that "mutually assured default" is still guaranteed but that "mutually assured settlement" cannot occur. Hence if all banks deliver at t ϭ 1, then under gross settlement banks will always find default optimal. "All deliver and all default" is not a symmetric equilibrium, however; so in this case the only possible symmetric equilibrium is autarky. We will denote the region of the (α,β) space where this case occurs (in the absence of attachable manna) as the region of inherent mistrust since in this case optimistic expectations concerning counterparties' willingness to settle are by themselves insufficient to sustain trade. Likewise, guarantees of settlement would be of little value in this case as settlement guarantees would not give banks an incentive to supply intermediate goods.
This situation can be rectified if manna endowments are large enough and if banks have some means of precommitting to make these attachable. A collateral facility may also be effective, but it will require prohibitively high levels of collateral as default incentives grow. In addition to preventing defaults at the settlement stage, the collateral requirement must also address the problem of potential delivery failures. To see this, consider the case of a bank that takes delivery of an intermediate good but does not deliver. The bank then has F ϩ C final goods and a settlement obligation of P. For sufficiently large α Ͻ 1, the bank's payoff from not delivering and defaulting on its settlement obligation, which is α(F ϩ C), must exceed its payoff from delivering and settling, which is F. Collateral requirements must be large enough to counteract this incentive.
Proposition 4: Suppose that α and β fall in the region of inherent mistrust. Then, under gross settlement (i) If banks' manna endowments are not attachable, then autarky prevails; (ii) If banks' manna endowments are attachable, then for sufficiently large manna endowments, the all-deliver, all-settle equilibrium prevails; (iii) An all-deliver, all-settle equilibrium is also possible with a collateralization requirement, but the collateral requirement must satisfy Condition (13) and
F(1 Ϫ γ) ϩ Cγ Ͼ α(F ϩ C)(1 Ϫ γ) ,(14)
and this equilibrium is dominated by the equilibrium in (ii); Under net settlement, the following hold (iv) Under an unwinding rule, autarky prevails; (v) Under a Lamfalussy rule, an all-deliver, all-settle equilibrium occurs if the collateral requirement satisfies Condition (14), but this equilibrium is dominated by the equilibrium in (ii).
Proposition 4 establishes that trade can occur in the case of inherent mistrust under either gross or net settlement. As in Proposition 3, gross settlement requires either attachability of banks' manna endowments or the use of a collateral facility.
Greater amounts of collateral are required as creditors' priority diminishes, so opportunity costs increase. In the case of net settlement, weakened creditors' priority (relative to Proposition 3) also leads to a greater (positive versus zero) collateral requirement to ensure settlement. The additional restriction on collateral comes from the possible deviation of defaulting without delivering the intermediate goods, a deviation that was automatically dominated under the assumptions of the earlier results.
In the case of inherent mistrust, Proposition 4 suggests that either net or gross settlement may dominate, depending on circumstances. If banks' manna endowments can be made attachable, then gross settlement may be able to support trade without the use of a collateral facility. If collateral must be used, then net settlement will dominate gross: the amount of collateral required under gross settlement is slightly higher than the collateral required under net settlement since the former collateralization requirement must satisfy both Conditions (13) and (14), whereas the latter need satisfy only the "delivery incentive condition," Condition (14).
MULTIPLE TRADING ROUNDS
We now consider a variation of the model where there is a second round of trading. This modified structure will allow us to consider the costs associated with delays in trading and settlement; for a more detailed discussion of these issues see e.g., Kobayakawa (1997) , Angelini (1998) , or Kahn and Roberds (1998) . It will also allow us to more directly consider issues linked to "delivery versus payment" (DVP).
Formally, there are now three additional time periods, i.e., t ϭ 3, 4, 5 (see Table  1 for a schedule of events in the extended model). Banks that have not contracted for delivery of an intermediate good may now do so during period t ϭ 3. During period t ϭ 4, it is possible for banks who have not already delivered intermediate goods to customize and deliver these goods. Production and delivery of the final good can now take place during t ϭ 5 as well as during t ϭ 2. Consumption of the final good now occurs at t ϭ 5. However, production is less efficient during the "afternoon" (at t ϭ 5) than in the "mornings" (at t ϭ 2), so one unit of an intermediate good yields only δF units of utility, where F Ϫ1 Ͻ δ Ͻ 1. The motivation is that trades that must be conducted late in the day are somewhat less valuable than the trades conducted early on. The presence of the discount factor places a lower ceiling on intermediate good prices if trading occurs in the afternoon, in which case P Ͻ δF.
It is now necessary to extend the strategy space to accommodate the additional round of trading. Under a real-time gross settlement system, settlement in the form of final good transfers can occur in either the morning (t ϭ 2) or in the afternoon (t ϭ 5). Hence, we redefine σ as σ ϭ (τ, d, s, τ′, d′, s′) , where τ, d, and s are as before. The components τ′, d′, and s′, respectively represent a bank's afternoon decision to trade, deliver, and settle. Under the net settlement system, there is only one daily settlement, at t ϭ 5, i.e., the net settlement system operates as a "delayed net settlement" (DNS) system, so under net settlement s ϭ 0 automatically. The following result describes symmetric Nash equilibria in the two-round game.
Proposition 5: With two rounds of trading, suppose that conditions (i) and (iii) of Lemma 1 hold for the case where the banks' manna is not attachable. Then under RTGS (a) The equilibria described in Propositions 1 and 2 are also equilibria in the two-round case. (b) If there is no attachability of manna endowments and no collateral facility, an equilibrium can occur where all banks deliver and all banks settle, but with delay. (c) The delayed equilibrium in (ii) is dominated by the all-settle, all-deliver equilibrium without delay. However, the delayed equilibrium dominates autarky. Under net settlement, (d) Only the all-deliver, all-settle equilibrium is possible.
Proposition 5 illustrates yet another potential advantage of net settlement over gross, which is that net settlement can eliminate equilibria where fear of default leads to costly delays in trading and settlement. As in Proposition 3, the key feature of net settlement in preventing trading delays is its "built-in" assignment of priority to bank's trading counterparties.
In real-world payment systems, it is common for transaction levels to peak late in the day. A number of papers (Angelini, 2000, McAndrews and Rajan, 2000) document this pattern and attribute this to banks' desire to avoid the funding costs of payments made earlier in the day. Proposition 5 identifies another potential reason for payment delays, namely the desire to avoid strategic default.
Finally, we note that delay costs could also result if the RTGS system were reconfigured as a delivery versus payment (DVP) system. Suppose that the payment system were reconfigured so that intermediate goods could only be bought with other goods, not promises to deliver goods at the close of business. Under this reinterpretation, banks would then have to purchase one another's intermediate goods with their own intermediate goods or with manna. In the former case, banks would essentially be "collateralizing" their purchases with their own intermediate goods, and the corollary to Proposition 2 would apply. In the latter case, banks must wait until their manna endowments arrive at t ϭ 2, again implying a loss in production. In short, DVP can eliminate gridlock but again some cost may be involved.
IMPLICATIONS
Payment arrangements always require some sort of credit in order to function (see Goodfriend 1990) . Above, we have investigated alternative sets of rules for allocating the risks associated with "payments credit," focusing on the differences between net and gross settlement. The discussion shows, perhaps surprisingly, that net settlement can offer advantages over gross in terms of reducing defaults. Gridlock equilibria that occur under gross settlement do not occur under net settlement arrangements (Propositions 1 and 3). Net settlement can also eliminate equilibria in which trading is delayed (Proposition 5). In situations where collateral is needed to effect settlement, a net settlement system may require less collateral than does a gross settlement system (Propositions 2, 3, and 4). Gross settlement can be made more efficient if banks can establish a facility for making their incoming payments attachable, but enforcing attachability may be difficult in practice. In some cases (with the exception of the inherent mistrust environment of Proposition 4), a government guarantee would be sufficient to effect settlement, but in practice governments may be reluctant to extend blanket guarantees to all payment system participants.
As noted above, in our setup net settlement often dominates because it offers an easy way of enforcing creditors' priority. By substituting each party's original payment obligation with an obligation to a centralized counterparty, a net settlement system can allow for offsets that could not occur under a decentralized (i.e., gross) settlement system. In other words, netting in effect replaces a difficult-to-enforce debt obligation with another, inherently more enforceable one. This feature of netting will be most valuable in environments with the following features. First, violations of creditors' priority must be severe enough for the offset provided by netting to significantly increase the strength of a creditor's claim. Second, offsetting positions must be sufficiently likely, i.e., there must be an approximate match in both the timing and magnitude of payments among a given group.
Our view of netting is related to one advanced by Freeman (1996) and Green (1997) . In the model they utilize, debt obligations are either perfectly enforceable or completely unenforceable according to whether debtor and creditor are spatially separated. Under gross settlement, distortions can result when some creditors become physically separated from their debtors, causing them to have to clear their debt through third parties at less than full value. Green shows that a net settlement system can improve welfare by allowing agents' original obligations to be replaced with a set of (enforceable) net claims, while Freeman shows that the availability of free intraday loans from the central bank will have the same effect. In our model no debt contracts are ruled out a priori, but all contracts are only imperfectly enforceable. The inefficiency of gross settlement stems from either the presence of dominated equilibria (gridlock) or higher shadow costs of debt issue resulting from collateral requirements necessary to preclude such equilibria. As in Green's setup, the efficiency of net settlement stems from the substitution of more enforceable claims held by a central counterparty for a less enforceable set of decentralized claims. We can also replicate Freeman's result by allowing substitution of central bank debt for private debt, but only in cases where the central bank has a sufficient claim on banks' incoming payments.
We believe that the capacity of netting to reduce settlement risk is an important factor behind the historical predominance of net settlement arrangements for largevalue transactions. The widespread use of net settlement arrangements among banks dates back at least to the Middle Ages (DeRoover 1948). In U.S. banking history, net settlement arrangements predominated before the founding of the Federal Reserve (Cannon 1910), and net settlement arrangements continue to be employed today. The netting of settlement obligations has also been an important component of arrangements for settling trades in many types of financial instruments (see Baer, France, and Moser 1995) . And as recently as the early 1990s, most large-value payment systems in the developed countries were settling on a net basis (see FolkertsLandau, Garber, and Schoenmaker 1996) .
Our analysis has abstracted from some disadvantageous features of netting systems that have been modeled elsewhere. A number of papers on net settlement (Angelini and Giannini, 1994 , Emmons, 1995 , Schoenmaker, 1995 , McAndrews and Roberds, 1999 emphasize the tendency of netting systems to focus credit risk within a central counterparty. This risk will be most prominent when there are mismatches in the timing and magnitude of funds transfers. Kahn and Roberds (1998) show how such mismatches can increase credit risk when payments are made in a net settlement system, relative to RTGS with DVP. Freixas and Parigi (1998) show that net settlement can also mask information that would otherwise be revealed by a bank's funds outflows. This loss of information leads to welfare losses because it discourages prompt liquidation of insolvent banks. Given these drawbacks, the general integrity of a net settlement system will require risk controls (such as position limits, capital requirements, etc.) plus some agreement for sharing losses among system participants. However, an agreement that spreads losses over participating banks can also dilute banks' incentives for mutual monitoring, potentially leading to moral hazard problems (Rochet and Tirole 1996) .
As we have pointed out, net settlement arrangements have been coping with such problems for centuries, through a combination of membership requirements, risk controls such as position limits, and appropriate levels of mutual monitoring. While such measures are costly to implement, netting affords an "automatic" enhancement of creditors' rights that may have been difficult or in some cases impossible to obtain through other means.
Both the analysis above and the historical tradition of net settlement clearly run counter to the recent changeover of many large-value systems from net settlement to gross settlement systems. Currently most large-value payment systems in the developed countries are operating as RTGS systems. This trend is probably driven by issues that are not included in our model. In particular, some of the impetus for different countries to adopt RTGS systems was the need to provide a standard interface for possible multicurrency and multicountry settlement arrangements. Furthermore, the cost of operating RTGS systems has probably declined relative to netting systems as information and communication technologies have improved. Legal enforcement of netting agreements is weak in some countries, putting net settlement at a disadvantage to gross settlement in a way our model does not address. Notwithstanding these reasons for the trend toward RTGS, our analysis leads to the conclusion that one should not interpret this trend as proof that RTGS systems are inherently superior or less risky than netting systems.
Another contemporary development has been the appearance of settlement systems that incorporate queuing arrangements (e.g., RTGSplus in Germany, SIC in Switzerland, and CHIPS in the U.S.). In these systems, a bank's payments are not immediately debited from its account but instead are sent to a central queue. If the queue contains an (approximately) offsetting set of payments from other system participants, the payment is settled within a short period of time, otherwise it remains in queue. Payments that are not offset over a certain period of time (most often a day) must be settled by conventional net or gross settlement arrangements. Such systems are "intermediate" between gross and net systems in the sense that they allow for some degree of offsetting but typically less than what would occur under net settlement (see Roberds 1999 for a discussion). These systems may be useful in that they allow policy makers to trade off the advantages and disadvantages of net versus gross settlement by varying parameters such as the length of time between mandatory settlements.
Our comparative analysis of RTGS and netting systems suggests that some commonly understood advantages of RTGS systems are only available when DVP is employed. The major advantage of netting is not necessarily its reduced need for liquidity (although one of the advantages we find is the reduced need for collateral in netting systems), as is usually discussed, but its greater facilitation of timely trading and the reduced incentives for strategic default in anticipation of others' default. When deciding on the design of a payment system and choosing between a gross or a net settlement system, this advantage should be understood and balanced against any central-counterparty risk that might arise in a netting system. NOTES 1. In principle, production might require many types of intermediate goods and hence exchanges with multiple suppliers. For simplicity we consider the case where each producer has exactly one supplier.
2. Our "manna" resembles Kocherlakota's (2000) "collateral." The value of manna is public information, however.
3. The closest financial-market analog to the Kiyotaki-Moore economy may be trading in OTC derivatives. As is the case for the K-M economy, "customization" of contracts is a key feature of OTC derivatives markets (see Kroszner 1999) . Partly due to this customization, settlement of OTC trades is not done in the same manner as for exchange-traded derivatives. There is no centralized exchange where positions in various contracts are marked to market and netted prior to settlement. Hence, if any netting occurs, it occurs in funds obligations only.
4. The debtor's share might arise, for example, from diversion of his project's assets to a private use. 5. We exclude the endpoints in order to exclude nuisance (i.e., mixed strategy) equilibria in which banks are indifferent between trading or not trading. The details of the bargaining process are left unspecified.
